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COMMENTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CREATION OF EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
INTRODUCTION
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act' provides that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board2 may order a party guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice "to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of [the]
Act."' 3 Some have criticized the lack of effectiveness of remedies fashioned under
this rather broad congressional mandate. 4 The ineffectiveness of remedial orders
in the past seemed due to the failure of the Board to be creative and imaginative
in fashioning orders. Recently, however, the Board appears to have recognized
the inadequacy of traditional remedies in certain labor-management situations.5
This recognition has resulted in the Board's creation of orders designed to more
adequately redress the harms suffered. For example in the past the Board would
have remedied all pre-election coercion cases by a cease and desist order ac-
companied by a rerun election. Today it will look more closely at the effects of
the coercion and if it finds that a majority was destroyed by the coercion an
order to bargain with the union might be included in the remedy. Reluctance
of the courts to accept and enforce these and other novel orders, however, may
well be the greatest obstacle to achieving the goal of more effective remedies.A
The Board is not alone in its concern. Congress also has been considering
the problems of inadequate remedies and has generally suggested increasing
the power of the Board by adding particular new powers to its arsenal, such as
allowing the Board to impose double or treble damages or to remove the tax
deductibility of payments of certain awards granted by the Board.7 Thus the
Board, limited by its delegated authority, is beginning to operate imaginatively
within these limitations albeit hampered by a reluctant judiciary. The legis-
1. 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) [hereinafter cited as
the NLRA or the Act] which provides:
If ... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint
has engaged or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this subchapter.
2. Hereinafter cited as the Board.
3. 49 State. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
4. See Hearings on H.R. 667, H.R. 976, H.R. 1134, H.R. 1548, H.R. 2038, H.R. 3355,
HR. 4278, H.R. 5918, H.R. 6080 Before the Special Subcom. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 71 (1966) [hereinafter cited as the Thompson
Report]; McCulloch, An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB, 15 Lab. L.J.
755 (1964); McCulloch, Address to the Federal Bar Association Convention, 39 U.S.L. Week
2133 (Sept. 19, 1961).
5. See notes 28-85 and accompanying text.
6. See notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
7. See Thompson Report 68-79.
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lature, on the other hand, is considering broadening these confines. The question
is whether the efforts of both are necessary to fulfill the desire for more effective
remedies.
I. TaE COURTS: A NEED EOR JUDICIAL COOPERATION
The Board's efforts to create orders which effectively remedy particular sit-
uations will necessarily be in vain without the cooperation of the reviewing
courts.8 Almost from the inception of the Act, the courts became involved in
limiting the scope of the Board's section 10(c) remedial authority. While early
cases decided under the Act made the Board's power very broad, 9 the courts have
set certain limitations on the Board. It is clear that the courts construe the Act
to be remedial in nature and not punitive, and where the courts have found the
Board's remedy to be punitive the remedy has not been upheld.10
It has been established that deterring the violation of the Act is not
by itself a proper basis for a remedy." This disallowance of deterrence as a
basis of remedial orders is not in keeping with the public interest aspect of the
Act. The ends of labor-management tranquility are certainly better served
if the unfair labor practice never occurs.
A. A Need for Recognition of Multiple Interests
The field of labor-management relations is characterized by the many
interests involved. The basic encounter between labor and management presents
the collective interests of the individual employees against the collective interests
of the owners of industry. Decisions reached in the accommodation of these
interests have effects beyond the parties involved. There is an ever present public
interest in reaching results which preserve a commercial tranquility. The basic
8. Board orders come before the court of appeals whenever the Board seeks enforce-
ment of a decision or a party petitions for a review. NLRA § 10(e)-(f), 49 Stat. 454-55
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The Supreme
Court indicated that the Board's affirmative orders would be upheld unless arbitrary and
capricious because "the relief which the statute empowers the Board to grant is to be
adapted to the situation which calls for redress.' Id. at 348. See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) in which the Supreme Court stated that "attainment of a great
national policy through expert administration in collaboration with limited judicial review
must not be confined within narrow cannons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancel-
lors in ordinary private controversies." Id. at 187.
10. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), where the Supreme
Court refused to enforce an order by the Board which in addition to providing for back
pay, directed the employer to deduct from the payments to reinstated employees the amounts
the employees had received for work performed on "work relief projects" and to pay over
such amounts to the appropriate governmental agencies.
11. Coats & Clark, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 237 (1955), modified, 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1957). There was no finding of discriminatory discharge where an employee quit her job.
There was, however, a finding by the Board that the employer had harassed the employee in
the past. The Board ordered reinstatment as a remedy for the harassment. The reinstatement
order was denied enforcement by the court bcause it neither made some one whole who had
been deprived of a right protected by the Act, nor did it prevent the employer from benefiting
from his misdeed. The court characterized the reinstatement order as serving as an example-
deterrent in nature and therefore unenforceable.
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policy statement introducing the Act12 emphasizes that the NLRB is a public
agency enforcing public rights.'3 Congress apparently hoped to free commerce
from labor-management strife through the workings of the Board, and the
workings of the Board itself attest to the public orientation of the Act.' 4 Never-
theless, the actual recognition of the public interest is often subordinated to
the private interests of the litigating parties.' 5 It would be preferable for the
courts to balance the respective public and private interests before reaching a
decision.
The Supreme Court itself has rendered decisions which tend to restrict the
Board to the adjudication of private rights. In Nathanson v. NLRB, 0 the Court,
in denying that a Board back pay award against a bankrupt employer was a
debt to the United States, characterized the Board as an "agent for the injured
employees," collecting for the benefit of private persons.17 The position of the
Court in this respect is difficult to accept in that it seems to insist that if the
public interest is to be protected then a private party also benefiting from the
order must act as a conduit to the public. This position is even more bothersome
in light of other pronouncements by the Supreme Court. Eleven years before its
decision in the Nathanson case, the Court in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 18
stated that the Board
does not exist for "adjudication of private rights"; it "acts in a public
capacity to give effect to the declared public policy of the Act to
eliminate and prevent obstruction to interstate commerce by encour-
aging collective bargaining."'19
In most situations there are both private and public interests involved.
Every affirmative action directed toward redressing a private harm is but a
step toward the ultimate goal of industrial peace. Perhaps the courts have
become so accustomed to seeing the private interest coupled with public interest
that they are reluctant to consider the public aspect without its private counter-
part. However, failing to consider seriously the public interest in the absence of
12. NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); NLRB v. Fant Milling
Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1959); NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1960);
Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 426 (1950).
14. Although the Board cannot act until a private party files a charge, the General
Counsel, rather than the private parties, must pursue complaints, direct the inquiry and
present the ultimate issues in the case. See NLRA § 10(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935) as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964); NLRA § 3(d), added by 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964).
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1955).
16. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
17. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1952) (dictum). Commentators appear to
accept the court's language. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 91,
163-64 (1953).
18. 313 US. 177 (1941).
19. Id. at 193. See also National Licorice Co. v. Labor Bd., 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940);
Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
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a private interest being protected ignores one of the basic policies of the Act.20
The problem is not limited to the public-private dichotomy. It is becoming
increasingly difficult to predict what interests and whose rights within the private
sector will be protected by the courts. In NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,2 1 the
Supreme Court was confronted with a multi-plant employer's closing of one
of his plants and a discharging of employees in that plant because of their union
activity. The court set up certain criteria for finding an unfair labor practice
when an employer closes one of his plants.22 Among other factors it must be
shown that the discharge of the employees in the one plant was done to "chill"
unionism in the other plants.23 Ignored are the interests of the employees who
were in fact discriminatorily discharged for participating in supposedly pro-
tected activities.
2 4
One positive factor in the decision is that it perceived a legitimate interest
in protecting union activity in the other plants. However, even that interest
has not been fully appreciated by the Court of Appeals when found in a slightly
different context. In II'. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 25 the second circuit refused
to enforce that part of the order which required the employer to read a state-
ment reciting the findings of the Board to the employees in all of his plants. The
court without explanation modified the order to require the reading only in the
plants where the unfair labor practice took place. 26 Thus, if Darlington hinted at
the existence of an interest to be protected, it apparently has gone partially un-
appreciated in the second circuit.
Evident in these cases is a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to recog-
nize the existence of multiple interests in a given situation. While the Board is
undoubtedly more sensitive to competing interests, the presence of such interests
is rarely so subtle as to elude all but the expert eye. Nevertheless, as these de-
cisions indicate, many interests go unrecognized.
The courts should re-examine the restrictions they have placed on the
20. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941).
21. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
22. Id. at 275. "If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being dosed for
antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated with
or engaged in the same line of commercial activity as the dosed plant, of sufficient sub-
stantiality it gives promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement of unionization
in that business; (2) act to dose their plant with the purpose of producing such a result;
and (3) occupy a relationship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable
that its employees will fear that such business will also be dosed down if they persist in
organizational activities, we think that an unfair labor practice has been made out.'
23. Id.
24. For a critical discussion of the Darlington decision, see Summer, Labor Law In
the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 Yale L.J. 59, 63-67 (1965).
25. 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). The Board had found
that the employer had discriminatorily discharged 71 employees because of union activity.
26. Id. at 305. The court did enforce that part of order requiring that notice be sent
to each plant and to each employee. They modified the part requiring the employer to read
the notice to the employees to allow the employer at his option to have a representative of
the Board read it. The reading however was limited to the plants in which the unfair labor
practice had taken place. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 389 1005 (1967).
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Board in this regard. Essential to insuring that the Board provide adequate
remedies is a recognition and consideration by the courts of all the interests in-
volved in the cases before them.
B. A Need for More Meaningful Standards
A broader perspective on the part of the courts when dealing with Board
remedies will itself be hampered unless an attempt is made to define more mean-
ingful standards. The courts presently will strike down Board remedies found
to be "punitive. " 27 Every order requiring inconvenience or expense punishes
the guilty party and is thus "punitive" in a broad sense of the word. Hence the
term "punitive," when used as a standard, is overly broad and seems to lend
itself to constant redefinition to suit the position of the reviewing court. How-
ever, it is not impossible to define the term in such a way as to be useful. If,
for instance, the Board is permitted by the courts to order violators to take
certain actions designed to remove the fruits of the violation, then "punitive"
might be defined as requiring the violator to do more than give up his ill-gotten
gains. However the term is defined, it ought to afford some degree of definiteness
as to what the court will accept of the Board in the latter's formulation of
remedies. Thus, whatever other steps are taken to provide for more effective
remedies one most crucial to success concerns the courts' reevaluation of the
problem of standards with a view toward the general goal of more meaningful
remedies.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE REMED E BY Tim. BOARD
A discussion of some of the more recent applications of specific remedies at
the Board's disposal should indicate what can be accomplished by the Board
if imagination is employed.
A. The Bargaining Order As a Remedy for the Runaway Shop:
Garwin, A Case in Point
The Board has attempted to create imaginative remedies recently to cope
with the "runaway shop."2 8 Essentially the runaway shop involves a plant re-
location motivated in part or completely by a desire to avoid bargaining with
a union,2 9 and is considered an unfair labor practice.3 0 The standard remedy
27. See, e.g., Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655
(1961); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 63, 76 (9th Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 366
U.S. 910 (1961); NLRB v. Local 85, Sheet Metal Workers, 274 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961).
28. See Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.,),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967), enforcing and rev'g in part sub nom. Garwin Corp., 153
N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
29. Actually the plant relocation often presents another distinct labor relations prob-
lem-that of interpreting and applying a collective bargaining agreement. Involved in that
area are the contract rights of the parties. This Note deals only with the unfair labor prac-
tice aspects of the plant relocation.
30. It has long been held by the Board that an employer commits an unfair labor
834
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granted by the Board orders the employer at his option either to reinstate his
operation at the old site or, alternatively, to permit reinstatement at the new
site with reasonable moving expenses for the employees and their families.31
In addition the Board's order is usually accompanied by a conditional bargaining
order requiring the employer to bargain at the new location as soon as the
union establishes a majority there.32 Under some circumstances this type of
order would be an effective remedy, e.g., the situation in which the employees
would in fact be likely to follow the plant in relocation. Such is the case in
short distance moves.
3 3
However, in the recent case of Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB
(Garwin Corp.),34 the Board was confronted with a situation involving the re-
location of a New York plant to Florida. The move left behind employees, many
of whom were married women, and substantially all of whom could be absorbed
in other jobs in their home locale because of a general labor shortage.
35 Upon a
finding of a violation of the Act by the employer, the Board's trial examiner
recommended the standard order, giving the employer the option of either
returning his business to New York or alternatively offering to reinstate the
New York employees in his Florida plant.3
6 The Board, recognizing the ineffec-
tiveness of applying this remedy, broadened the order suggested by the trial
examiner. 37 The Board reasoned that since few if any of the New York em-
ployees would go to Florida even with a guaranteed reinstatement, the traditional
remedy would not serve to deter the employer who wished to escape the union by
distant relocation. 38 In an effort therefore to fashion a meaningful remedy the
Board ordered the employer to bargain on request, at the new site without
regard to majority statusP9 Thus the Board hoped to deprive the employer of
the "fruits" of his illegal action of moving the plant to Florida to avoid dealing
with the union.40 The Board concluded that "on balance," the statutory right
of the Florida employees to choose their own bargaining representative "must
practice under sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2) of the Act when he closes his plant at one
location and moves to another to avoid his obligations under the Act. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961); Rome Prods. Co., 77 NL.R.B.
1217 (1948); Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Winchester, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961); Rome Prods. Co.,
77 NL.R.B. 1217 (1948); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940). But see NLRB
v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
32. See, e.g., Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953).
33. See, e.g., Rapid Bindery, Inc. v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); California
Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, enforced, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Brown Truck &
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
34. 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967), enforcing and rev'g
in part sub -nom. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
35. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 (1965).
36. Id. at 683.
37. Id. at 668.
38. Id. at 666.
39. Id. at 668.
40. Id. at 666.
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yield to the statutory objective of fashioning a meaningful remedy for the un-
fair practices found."'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in reviewing the decision of
the Board, held that the provision requiring the employer to bargain with the
union without regard to majority status was an infringement upon the Section 7
rights of the new employees by depriving them of the opportunity to select
their own bargaining representative.42 The court conceded that the Section 7
rights were not absolute to the exclusion of all others but held that infringe-
ment upon those rights must be justified by showing a protection of equally or
more vital interests.43 The other interest that the Board was trying to protect
was the general interest of deterring this type of employer conduct. The court
characterized the Board's order as "punitive" since it aimed at deterring certain
employer actions without relation to redressing grievances of the New York
workers.44 While it must be admitted that the Board's remedy did little for the
New York workers left behind by the runaway plant, it at least made an
attempt to prevent a recurrence of the violation by other employers. The result
is that the employer can protect himself in a relocation case by moving far enough
so that his help will not follow him. Under such circumstances the right given
the employees by the NLRA is non-existent because there is no effective remedy
to protect it. The standard remedy is posited in the alternative requiring the
employer to either return his plant or reinstate those employees who so desire
at his new site.45 Thus where the employees are unable to move because of the
great distance involved, the entire remedy is meaningless since the employer
can offer this option and thereby discharge his responsibilities under the Board
order.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
Board for further consideration of the remedy. Pursuant to this reconsidera-
tion, the Board ordered the employer to furnish the union with the names and
addresses of the employees at its Florida plant. In addition they ordered that
the union have access to the plant bulletin boards. Furthermore, the Board
ordered the employer to bargain upon a showing that a majority of the em-
ployees at the Florida plant have designated the union as their representative. 40
41. Id. at 666.
42. Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967). For a criticism of the decision see Note, 17 Buff. L.
Rev. 559 (1968).
43. Id. at 302. Employee's free choice has been sacrificed in the past in the workings
of NLRB. The Act itself contains provisions for certification elections and provides that
after a valid certification or decertification election has been held the Board cannot hold
a second election until one year has elapsed. 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(3) (1964). Even if after the election the overwhelming majority wants another
election to change their choice the one year period still applies. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954).
44. Id. at 303.
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Winchester, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961); Rome Prods.
Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
46. Garwin Corp., NLRB, 67 LRRM 1296 (1968). It is quite possible that the court
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It is questionable as to whether another circuit will decide differently on
facts similar to Garwin.4 7 Nevertheless the original Garwin order represents a
promising effort on the part of the Board to use imagination in fashioning its
remedies. At the same time, however, Garwin points up the problem that is
going to be encountered when the remedial orders of the Board depart from
standard orders, i.e., the reluctance of the courts to become involved in serious
balancing of interests.48 Indeed this problem may have to be resolved by leaving
the balancing process to the Board. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court
in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,49 the formulation of affirmative
orders to remedy unfair labor practices is "peculiarly a matter for administrative
competence.", ° Perhaps, therefore, the courts in reviewing the Board orders
should allow wide discretion and base its decision on whether or not the Board
recognizes the particular facts before it and adequately explains the considera-
tions that shaped the order.51
B. Retroactive Compensation as a Remedy for Refusal to Bargain
Imagination in the fashioning of orders is also occurring at the Board trial
examiner level. In two recent cases 52 (the Ex-Cell-O cases) as yet undecided by
the Board, the trial examiners have recommended orders which if accepted by
the Board and enforced by the courts would represent a most dramatic impact
on the area of collective bargaining. Basically the examiners in the Ex-Cell-O
cases have recommended that the NLRB direct payment of retroactive com-
pensation to workers who as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain have
of appeals will not enforce the names-and-addresses part of this order. To date the Board
has been successful in applying a names-and-addresses rule to representation cases. In
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., NLRB 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), the Board ruled that where
a representation election has been scheduled, the employer must file with the Board a list
of names and addresses of all employees eligible to vote in the election. The Board was un-
successful in convincing a federal district court to enforce this rule through subpoena pro-
ceedings. On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, upheld the subpoena in
NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Division, 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967). On the other hand, the
Second Circuit refused to enforce the names-and-addresses rule as a remedy for an unfair
labor practice in Textile Workers Union v. NLRB [J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.], 388 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1967).
47. The District of Columbia is one of the Board's "friendliest" in terms of per-
centage of reversals; thus, reversal here may portend reversal elsewhere. And the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari tends to strengthen the precedent.
48. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
49. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
50. Id. at 214. The current standards of review for Board orders are discussed in
Flannery, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, U. Pa. L. Rev. 69, 91-92 (1963). The standards range anywhere from treating
the remedies as facts and subjecting them to the "substantial evidence on the record as a
whole" standard; to only requiring that no patent attempt to achieve ends other than
those effectuating the policies of the Act are present.
51. See Flannery, supra note 50, at 94.
52. In July, 1967 the Board heard oral argument in a group of three cases identified
as the Ex-Cell-O cases. The respective unions in these cases requested that the Board add
a monetary award to its usual 8(a) (5) order to bargain in an effort to compensate the
employees for wage increases or other economic benefits they might have gained had the
bargaining occurred when it should have. Two of the examiners acquiesced in the request.
One did not. The cases are presently pending before the Board.
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suffered economic loss."3 In the past when the Board found that an employer
was guilty of refusing to bargain with a majority representative of his employees
in an appropriate unit the Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from
such refusal and to bargain with the union upon request.'5 The Board also has
in appropriate cases used its authority to require an employer to sign a written
contract containing the terms agreed upon during negotiations. 5 The significant
characteristic of the traditional remedies however has been that they take
effect as of the time of the order by the Board or its enforcement by the courts.
Under the present system it is argued that the employer is tempted to violate
the act and refuse to bargain because immediate collective bargaining probably
will result in a contract which raises the employer's wage bill." By refusing to
bargain, the employer sets into operation the procedure designed to force him
to bargain-a procedure which will delay bargaining for up to two or more
years.57 Such a delay provides the employer with a short-term saving on wages
and most likely results in a weakening of organizational impetus s8 Thus there
is much for the employer to gain and little if anything for him to lose by his
refusal to bargain with a union which has won an election and is certified to
bargain.
In effect the remedy recommended is designed to make employees whole
for the wages and fringe benefits they might have received but for the employer's
refusal to bargain. While the foregoing seems predicated on intentional frustra-
tions by the employer, the trial examiner in one of the Ex-Cell-O cases went so
far as to indicate that a finding of hostility to the collective bargaining process
was not necessary to allow the imposition of the suggested remedy. The trial
examiner stated that since
[t]he encouragement of collective bargaining is the central objective
of the Act . . . [t]he detriment to collective bargaining occurs
whether the employer in good faith believes that the Board has
made a serious error of law in the representation proceeding or
whether the employer, as a deliberate maneuver to stall bargaining,
raises spurious objections and thereafter pursues them to the utmost. 0
Probably the greatest objection to the use of this "make whole" type of
order from an administrative point of view is that it will entail speculation as
to what terms the union and company might have agreed. In most situations,
however, facts necessary to make a sufficiently accurate appraisal would be
available in the surrounding conditions as presented in testimony. For instance,
the examiner in Ex-Cell-O found that there were significant differences between
53. Ex-Cell-O Corp., Trial Examiner's Dec. No. 80-67, at 15 (Elvood, Ind. 1967)
[hereinafter cited TXD No.].
54. See, e.g., Burgle Vinegar Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 829, 830-31 (1946).
55. See H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
56. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., TXD No. 80-67, at 11 (1967).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 12.
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conditions of employment in the plant in question and those in other plants in
the same industry owned by the employer. 60 The differences, he stated, repre-
sented a "sound basis" for finding the minimum additional benefits the com-
pany's employees would have received. 61
If it can be assumed that both the employer and the union would prefer
to work out their own agreements, the effect of the use of the "make-whole"
order in the refusal-to-bargain cases which arise might have the effect of en-
couraging collective bargaining from the outset. The degree to which such
encouragement will in fact result will depend on the circumstances. An employer
who is sufficiently certain that the courts will not enforce the particular bar-
gaining order will not bargain under it. Where, on the other hand, the employer
is relatively sure that the bargaining order will be enforced by the court along
with the "make whole" order, he may well bargain from the start. Those are
extreme cases. Problems arise when employers are uncertain as to the court's
response to his position, e.g., in situations where the employer has a well founded
argument that the Board has made an error in the representation proceeding. He
would have to choose between having control over the agreement by bargaining
at the outset on the one hand or losing his control over the terms by refusing
to bargain and letting the case go to the Board for decision on the other. Nor
is it altogether clear that the Board wants to assume the role of "term-maker"
for union-management agreements. One can visualize the amount of testimony
that would be involved if labor and management were to argue before the
Board what the terms would have been two years prior. Nevertheless it must be
admitted that the employee loses something in the period between the employer's
initial refusal to bargain and the final enforcement of a bargaining order by a
court.
Any solution to the problem would be more attractive if it avoided the
immense added burden on the Board which would result from requiring it to
decide what the agreement would have been. One possible alternative is that of
ordering the present agreement arrived at by the parties under the bargaining
order to be retroactive to the date of original refusal to bargain. While labor and
management may agree between themselves to make certain terms retroactive,
forcing such a term upon an employer would seem to go beyond what is needed.
In all probability the contract agreed to today will include higher wages than
that of two years ago. If the contract is given a retroactive effect, to the extent
that its terms exceed those that would have been agreed upon, it penalizes the
employer for his refusal to bargain. In cases where the employer was inten-
tionally stalling, such an effect might be justified as having been brought on the
60. After comparing data regarding employer's organized plants in neighboring
states with the plant in question, the trial examiner concluded that the benefits of the sub-
ject plant did not "measure up to those accorded the employees of the Respondent's
organized plants." Id. at 14.
61. Id.
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employer by his own bad faith. But what of the good faith refusal to bargain?
The employer there should not be penalized.
A second alternative to the order suggested by the examiner in Ex-Cell-O
might arguably avoid the problem of added administrative work loads as well
as not penalizing the employer who in good faith refused to bargain. The bar-
gaining order could be accompanied by an order directing the parties in their
collective bargaining sessions to bargain about a cash settlement for the loss
sustained by the employees during the period of refusal to bargain. Not only
would this keep the Board from having to make the decision but it would allow
the parties to decide the terms for themselves. 2
There is no question that the examiner's recommendations if adopted will
have a very significant impact on the refusal to bargain area. While the Board
might fairly reject the recommendation solely on the basis of its work load
ramifications, it is hoped that the Board will consider alternatives to remedy the
harm suffered by the employees. In the final analysis, the examiner in Ex-Cell-O
has done no more than attempt to place the parties in the same position in which
they would have been had it not been for the violation. It would seem that no
other approach would do more to "effectuate the policies of the Act."
C. The Bargaining Order as a Remedy for Pre-Election Coercion
The Board has traditionally exercised great control over activities during
an NLRB election campaign. 63 All effort is afforded to assure that elections take
place in an atmosphere which not even faintly threatens the exercise of free choice
on the part of employees.64 The Board has at its disposal two sources of remedial
authority: primarily, the Board has the authority to order a rerun election
which is no more than an exercise of the Board's general power to conduct
elections.a In addition to this general power, the Board has 10(c) remedial
powers where an unfair labor practice has been committed, that is the Board
may give a cease and desist order as well as ordering the guilty party to per-
form affirmative actions which will "effectuate the policies of the Act."60 Unless
an unfair labor practice is present the Board is without power to issue a cease'
62. The Board might ultimately become involved where the employer refused to
bargain in good faith with regard to the cash settlement. Leaving the parties to make their
own decision wherever possible however would substantially obviate overburdening the
Board.
63. See, e.g., Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966); Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
64. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). Furthermore, the
Board when overturning an election does not consider itself bound by the § 8(c) speech
rights. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964). See Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
1782, 1787 (1962); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 103 (1964).
65. NLRA § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
66. Id. § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). Where the
activity rises to the level of an unfair labor practice such as a violation of section 8(a)(1),
the Board may order a cease and desist order as well as other affirmative actions.
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and desist order or to take any other affirmative action with the exception of
ordering a new election, which the Board may do in the absence of an unfair
labor practice where it finds that the actions of one of the parties created an
atmosphere inconducive to a fair election.67 It is, however, in the area where
employer election activities go beyond disruption of laboratory conditions and
become substantive violations of the unfair labor provisions of the Act, that the
imagination of the Board should be called into play.65 The traditional Board
remedy for pre-election employer activities which rise to the level of unfair
labor practices is a combination of a re-run election and a cease and desist order
accompanied by a notice to the employees regarding the Board's finding.69
Where the unfair labor practice has not substantially effected the organizational
impetus, a standard cease and desist order along with an order for a new election
may be an adequate remedy.
Problems arise with regard to the adequacy of the standard remedy when
there has been significant damage to the organizational potential as a result of
the unfair labor practice.70 The Board has recently recognized that certain em-
ployer unfair labor practices have such an impact on organizational activity
that the standard order will not serve as an adequate remedy.71 In Scott's, Inc.,
the employer was found guilty of several unfair labor practices including the
discharge and layoff of a significant number of employees because of their
union activities.72 Viewing these violations as an attempt on the part of the
employer to destroy all organizational potential in the unit, the Board declared
"that the serious violations [require] something more than the usual remedial
action."73 Therefore the Board augmented its orders with provisions requiring
that letters be sent to each employee advising him of his organizational fights,
that the union be given access to the plant bulletin boards for a period of three
months and that the employer be required to provide for a union official to deliver
67. See, e.g., Des Moines Glove Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 225 (1964); Claussen Baking Co.,
134 N.L.R.B. 111 (1961); Myrna Mills, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 767 (1961); Bonita Ribbon
Mills & Brewton Weaving Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1115 (1949).
68. Where the employer has threatened that he will not bargain with any union, a
cease and desist order will perhaps prevent a reiteration of the statement by the employer
but its original impact on organizational potential may well remain.
69. See, e.g., Lufkin Rule Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 341 (1964).
70. Actions by the employer, such as discharging and laying off of employees who are
involved in union activities, have a significant effect on union organization. While these
actions are violative of the Act, they are remedied some time after the fact and under the
present law, cost the employer very little. The discharged or laid off employee is obliged
by law to mitigate the damages he has suffered by attempting to obtain employment else-
where. Thus, where this is done the employer must only pay what the employee has lost.
Even if the Board orders reinstatement with back pay, other employees are not likely to
forget their co-worker's dismissal-a result of his attempt to exercise his section 7 rights.
71. Scott's Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795 (1966).
72. Id. at 1543.
73. Id. at 1806, citing Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 21 U.S. 702. The Board stated:
"It would be an anomaly to preclude an employer's benefiting from misconduct which
destroy's a union's majority but to allow it to act with comparative impunity to prevent
such status from ever being attained."
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a speech to the employees on company time.7 4 It is to be noted however that the
Board has limited the Scott's type remedy to serious employer violations.75
It is questionable whether the Scott's type remedy will itself suffice in the
extreme cases where, because of the employer's unfair tactics, the damage done
to the organizational potential cannot be corrected.7 6 Probably the most powerful
weapon available to the Board in the area of pre-election coercion as in other
areas is the bargaining order.77 The rationale behind the bargaining order in
this context is that but for the unfair labor practice, the union would have
won the election. The use of the bargaining order as a remedy for pre-election
unfair tactics has been limited to situations where the union had a majority
before the unfair labor practice took place.78 The question arises as to whether
the bargaining order should be implemented where the union did not actually
have a majority but was developing one at the time of the employer's unfair
tactics.79 It has been suggested that under certain circumstances the bargaining
74. Id. at 1549.
75. 159 NL.R.B. 1795 at 1808. See also J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966).
H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714 (1965).
This remedy requiring that the employer give time for a union official to give a
speech can only be appreciated when viewed in perspective of the history of the "captive
audience" rule. The issue which has been debated concerns the right of a union to reply
where the employer has given an anti-union speech. In Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608
(1951) the Board announced a doctrine of equal opportunity, i.e., the employees in their
exercise of section 7 rights to organize have a right to hear both sides of the issue under
equal circumstances. The "equal opportunity doctrine" of Bonwit Teller was rejected in
Livingstone Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) where weighing heavily the employer's
section 8(c) right to give non-coercive speeches to employees the Board concluded that
to make such a right contingent upon his granting the union the same opportunity would
negate the right itself. In place of the "equal opportunity" approach the Board seems willing
to find an unfair labor practice where the employer who is enforcing a broad no-
solicitation rule speaks and denies the union opportunity to reply. See, e.g., May Dep't
Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962). The courts on the other hand have insisted that the
Board base its decision on the presence or absence of adequate alternative channels open to
the union to rebut the employer's statements. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co., 316 F.2d
797 (6th Cir. 1963).
Thus giving the union the right to speak on company time is in this context an extra-
ordinary remedy.
76. See Pollitt, NLRB Re-run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 209 (1963) in which
the author reports that in the 267 rerun elections conducted from 1960-1962, a different
result was obtained in nearly a third of the cases. But see Bok, supra note 65, at 124.
Dean Bok points out that since unions will not normally seek a rerun election without a
good chance of winning, the sample of cases is special and the percentage of reversals must
be viewed accordingly.
77. See Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944) in which the Supreme Court
affirmed a ruling of the Board ordering the employer to bargain with the union, without
benefit of an election, where the union lost its majority support after the employer's illegal
refusal to bargain. See also Note, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a) (5) of
the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 388 nn.7-8
(1966): "The Board conducted 7,355 elections in fiscal year 1962, 7,240 in fiscal year
1963, 7,309 in fiscal year 1964, and 7,824 in fiscal year 1965." During that same period the
Board issued 157, 165, 175 and 236 bargaining orders respectively. Id. at 388 n.8.
78. Compare Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944), with Scott's, Inc., 159
N.L.R.B. 1795; J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966) ; H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155
N.L.R.B. 714 (1965).
79. The distinction requiring the actual existence of a majority prior to the unfair
labor practice makes the effectiveness of the remedy turn on point in the organizational
drive that the employer commits the act. The employer is thus encouraged to commit
unfair labor practices at the earliest observation of union activity within his plant.
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order should be issued without regard to the existence or non-existence of a
prior majority status.80 Again, as in the case of the runaway shop, the Board
is faced with a balancing problem. On the one hand there is the interest involved
in protecting organizational activities of the employees. On the other, is the
Section 7 right of the employee to free choice. 81 Any time the Board considers
bargaining orders without regard to majority status these interests must be re-
weighed in their new and current context. Among those who favor the use of the
bargaining order in the pre-election unfair tactics situations, there seems to be
consensus that it ought to be used in a limited number of cases. The use ought
to be confined to the serious violation cases where no other remedy is suitable
because the violation may have adversely effected the union's acquisition of a
majority.8 2 Since it would be difficult to show in most cases that the violation
prevented the attainment of a majority, perhaps the Board should be allowed
to infer this from the seriousness of the violation and the closeness of the
election. Furthermore, in deference to the organizational rights of the current
majority, the order should provide for a reasonable time for which the order
is to run and a limitation on the period during which any contract negotiated
under the bargaining order may act as a bar.83
It is not certain just how the courts would react to a bargaining order
without a showing of majority status in the area of pre-election coercion. The
court in Garwin refused to enforce the bargaining order because they felt that
the Florida employee's Section 7 rights should be preserved where none of the
injured employees were being redressed. 84 However, the use of the bargaining
order in instances of pre-election coercion could be justified in that there would
be injured employees who would be receiving direct benefit of the remedy. If
Garwin could be taken as a judicial guideline for disallowing bargaining orders
80. See Bok, supra note 65, at 132-39. See also Comment, Employer Pre-Election
Coercion: A Suggested Approach for Effective Remedial Action, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1112,
1124-32.
81. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 697-98 (1944) (dissenting
opinion). Justice Rutledge said the issuance of bargaining orders without showing a
majority "would be to force men into unions and into dealing with their employers through
unions contrary to the employees' own wishes." Professor Bok points out however that
this argument is not dispositive of the question since unions already often maintain bargain-
ing rights without the support of a majority of the employees. Such is the case where
the union loses a majority during the term of a valid agreement. Bok, supra note 65, at 134.
82. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 65, at 137-38. "It would seem inappropriate to issue a
bargaining order in the absence of a preexisting majority, unless the unfair labor practice
involved were serious and deliberate. Unions should not be permitted to seize upon trivial
violations in order to obtain bargaining rights without an election. . . . As a general rule
. . . the order to bargain might well be restricted to cases involving discriminatory dis-
charges or clear threats of retaliation."
83. The Board in Garwin provided for a one-year contract bar for any collective
bargaining agreement negotiated by the parties if the union were unsuccessful in attempts
to achieve a majority at the new plant. This represents a modification of the existing con-
tract bar rules which generally provide a maximum three-year contract bar. See General
Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
84. Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295, 302 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
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in general, perhaps the Board would apply with optimism the bargaining order
in the area of pre-election coercion where no other remedy would be effective.
There is little doubt that using the bargaining order in these cases will
require careful analysis of the factual situation by the Board in its weighing
process. But if it is applied with care and accepted by the courts, the remedy
of the bargaining order can go far in alleviating the most flagrant forms of
pre-election violations without undue risk of harm to the employees or to the
employer.85
III. LEGISLATrrE AcTION To BROADEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD
An independent consideration of the problems related to remedies to effectu-
ate the policies of the NLRA is and has been taking place in the legislative
branch of the Federal Government.8" Generally the investigation is aimed at
determining whether the Board is doing all that it can do to assure fairness to
all parties in labor-management disputes. In addition those assigned to the task
are determining whether or not the NLRA itself has imperfections or deficien-
cies.87 Several specific suggestions have been made and an examination of some
of them may lend perspective to what is being attempted.
A. Treating Strikers Protesting Unfair Labor Practices as
Constructive Dischargees
Traditionally an employee who has been discharged by his employer be-
cause of union membership or activity was entitled to reinstatement to his old
job with back pay.88 In addition, under the doctrine of "constructive discharge"80
this particular remedy has been ordered by the Board where it finds that the
employee left his job as a result of the difficulties given him by his employer
because of his union affiliation or activity.90 On the other hand, employees who
strike in protest of an unfair labor practice are entitled only to reinstatement
upon request if the Board determines that the employer is guilty of violating an
unfair labor practice provision.91 The Board orders have not contained any
85. See Bok, supra note 65, at 139.
86. See generally The Thompson Report; see also Subcommittee on NLRB, House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong. 1st Sess., Administration of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act by the NLRB (Comm. Print. 1961).
87. Thompson Report 1.
88. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964) makes it unlawful for an employer
to discharge an employee with the intent of encouraging or discouraging labor organization
membership or activity. Id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) provides authority for the
Board to order reinstatement with or without back pay so as to "effectuate the policies of
the Act."
89. An employee is constructively discharged where his employer makes working condi-
tions so unbearable that the employee is forced to resign. See NLRB v. Chicago Apparatus
Co., 116 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1940). See also Elliott-Williams Co. (Sheet Metal Workers,
Local 503), 149 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1964).
9o. Id.
91. See Walsh-Sumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294 (1960), enforced by
consent decree, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961); National Furniture Mfg. Co., 130 N.L.R.B.
712 (1961).
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provision for back pay in these situations. Since the Board is not allowed to
levy penalties or punitive damages in the guise of back pay, the entire amount
of the award has to represent wages actually lost solely because of an unfair
practice. 92 Nevertheless the general remedy for employer violations which
characteristically make the employees' existence on the job very unpleasant is
a Board order coming a year or more after the infraction ordering the employer
to "cease and desist" from the unlawful conduct.93 Such an order does little if
anything to right the wrong done by the unfair labor practice. Nor does it deter
the employer from engaging in such practices.
It has been suggested that the Board be given the authority to broaden
the doctrine of "constructive discharge" so as to strengthen the sanctions for
violations of the Act.94 Specificially, it is suggested that the Board be given
authority to exercise discretion to consider the "wilfullness and impact of the
unfair labor practice" and to provide that where the violation was intentional
and of significant impact that it would be considered a "constructive discharge"
and entitle the employee to back pay for the time spent in the protest strike.9 5
In the situation where the violation was not willful or the impact not serious the
Board would not find a "constructive discharge" and the strikers would only
be entitled to the ordinary remedy of reinstatement upon request without back
pay.
00
The reason for establishing the doctrine was to protect the employee who,
instead of being discharged for his union activity, is "drummed" out by the
employer's harassment. Each employee, so treated, upon quitting becomes a
constructive dischargee. What is contemplated in the new application is that
any unfair labor practice striker will be treated as a constructive dischargee. It
is one thing to say that the individual employee who is being harassed ought
to be in the same position whether he quits or goes on strike. It is quite another
thing to say that all those striking for reasons less than unbearable harassment
are also "constructively discharged." The suggestion goes even further since the
anticipated application of the constructive discharge doctrine would take place
in a much different context than that in which it developed. The doctrine grew
up to protect those who were driven to resign as a result of their union interests
during the organizational period in the plant. Once the union is well established
in a plant there would not be such impetus for the employer to commit such
offenses. The contemplated extension of the doctrine would no doubt have its
major effect in the well organized plants. Specifically, it would be aimed at those
92. See, e.g., Leach d.b.a. Brookville Glove Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1956); Aronson
Printing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 799 (1939); Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1937).
93. Such is the power given the Board by NLRA § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).




employers and employer violations which exploit the delay inherent in the
Board processes as a means to frustrate the aims of the Act.
Those who favor adoption of the doctrine argue that practically speaking
the striking employees have been wronged from the time of the unfair labor
occurrence. The employees should not be punished because the system does not
respond immediately. Nor should the employer gain because of the delay inherent
in the administrative process. Furthermore, it is argued that if the employees
cannot obtain redress in a reasonable amount of time by pressure on the employer
and by filing a charge they should be allowed to strike without loss of pay.
While on its face this suggestion seems to be directed toward effectuating
the policies of the Act, it may in fact be contrary to one major policy, i.e., the
interest in avoiding strikes. 97 In the present circumstances an unfair labor
striker has to weigh the loss of wages in his decision to go on strike. To the
extent that the wage loss deters employees from striking in the first place and
to the extent that it encourages him to work for a quick settlement of the dif-
ferences when he is on strike, the wage loss itself effectuates the policies of the
Act. If the employees could strike with a guarantee of back pay he may well drag
his feet in reconciliation. In addition it should be noted that the unfair labor
practice striker already has preferential treatment over the economic striker.
The unfair labor striker's job is secure while he is on strike and any replacement
is temporary.98 On the other hand, the economic striker must risk his job since
the employer may hire permanent replacements. 9
B. Additional Sanctions
Congress has considered other sanctions having a more economic flavor-
as one of those making the suggestions stated: "hitting [the employer] in the
pocket book." 00
1. Double or Treble Damages
It has been suggested that section 10(c) be amended so as to permit the
Board to order reinstatement with double or treble back pay,101 in certain situa-
tions involving intentional violations and anti-union animus.162 The reason given
to support the suggestion is that under the present system the party contemplat-
ing the unfair labor practice can weigh the gains against the back pay he will have
to pay if he is found guilty of a violation, and plan his actions accordingly.
103
97. One of the underlying purposes of the NLRA was to provide mechanisms by which
employees, unions and management could work out their differences with the least effect on
the free flow of commerce. See 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
98. See, e.g., Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 120 NLRB 294, enf'd by consent
decree, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961).
99. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).





To the extent that this is true, the imposition of double or treble damages does
no more than add dollars and cents to one side of the scale in the weighing
process. Furthermore, just as the employer absorbs or passes on the cost of his
violation, under the straight back pay approach he can do it when the back-pay
assessment is double or treble. It probably is fair to assume that as the cost gets
higher the likelihood that it will be passed on to the public also increases. While
there is no doubt that such a damage approach would have some inhibiting effect,
the impact would necessarily be haphazard. The added cost may or may not
overcome the gains to be derived from the unfair labor practice in a given case.
The size of the offending firm may become determinative; e.g., the small business
would feel the pressure under many circumstances where the larger business
would scarcely notice the difference.10 4 The result would not seem to be altogether
fair nor would it, without deterring the larger business, be an effective remedy
if used in lieu of any other remedy.10 5 The net effect would be "to allow dis-
proportionate recoveries to employees with only a speculative possibility of
reducing the number of violations."' 1 6 In addition, any appraisal of this pro-
posal must take into consideration the obligation of the employee to mitigate
his losses by obtaining or attempting to obtain other employment.' 0 7 To the
extent that the employees are successful, the losses are minimized. Multiples of
the minimized damage are thus less and the effectiveness of the proposed remedy
as a deterrent is accordingly lessened.
2. Removal of Tax Deductibility of Board Awards
Many of those most concerned with making NLRB remedies more effective
have suggested that certain indirect pressure be brought to bear on the employer
who violates the unfair labor laws. Among the suggestions is a removal of the
present tax deductibility of NLRB awards.' 08 Currently, the employer is allowed
to deduct such costs as business expenses.10 9 The holdings in the area of tax
deductions for certain payments of awards seem to turn on whether the payment
is a "penalty" and whether the allowance of the deduction would frustrate the
policy of the law. 1 0 A semantic dilemma is present when these criteria are
applied to the question of whether a payment pursuant to the Board order is
deductible. If the payment is characterized as a penalty perhaps the remedy
104. Bok, at 127.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See NLRB v. Bishop, 288 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1955).
108. Thompson Report 72.
109. See Rev. Rul. 10430, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 174, in which the Commissioner held that
since the back pay award of the NLRB represented what the employees would have
earned had they not been absent from work as a result of labor difficulties such award was in
the nature of compensatory damages and therefore deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense.
110. See, e.g., Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 818 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
The fine paid by an interstate truck operator for violation of maximum weight limitation
was not deductible from operator's gross income as an ordinary and necessary business
expense because to do so would frustrate the policy behind the law.
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itself is punitive and thus ultra vires. However, if the payment is not punitive
can a deduction be denied? Apparently a denial of a deduction can be based
solely on whether or not the granting of such deduction would frustrate the
policies of the Act."" While it is clear that the allowance of a deduction is a
benefit to the employer, the degree of the benefit would probably not be so
great as to frustrate the policies of the Act. Since the awards themselves are
greatly reduced by the employee's obligation to mitigate the damages by finding
employment elsewhere," 2 the tax benefit resulting from the deduction would
itself be small. Thus, while multiple damages would be of questionable effective-
ness because of the small unit of damages being multiplied,"i8 the denial of a
deduction for damages paid would have an even smaller impact on the employer
for the same reason.
The economic pressures posited for legislative consideration have some
merits. Undoubtedly were they to be applied in the proper cases the policies
of the Act would be effectuated. However, some problems would remain un-
remedied, just as some violations are presently unremedied such as the "runaway
shop" in the Garwin case. n 4 In addition, it is not altogether clear that the legis-
lation is needed. It is entirely possible that the courts would view legislation of
this nature as an implicit congressional approval of the court's restrictions of
the Board under the latter's present mandate. Thus the legislation could be
viewed as a measured expansion of the Board's judicially defined power and
consequently a barrier to imaginative remedies. In the interest of more effective
remedies, Congress may not have to do more than state that the broad mandate
of the NLRA leaves much room for expansion by the Board in the area of
remedies. Thus the proper legislative action would amount to a committee sug-
gestion to the Board that it use more imaginatively the power it already has.
In areas where the Board is already creating new remedies, the suggestion would
operate as an encouragement. With regard to the reviewing courts, the suggestion
would represent a statement of legislative intent that the Board's power is
broader than the Board has realized and the courts in general have allowed.
CONCLUSION
There is little that can be done to protect the rights created under the
National Labor Relations Act without the use of effective remedies. The Board,
in recognition of this basic premise, has done much in attempting to fashion
remedies which correct the wrongs committed. Broader uses of the bargaining
order in the areas of the "runaway shops" and pre-election employer coercion
111. See Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949) in which
Judge Hand pointed out that "there are 'penalties' and 'penalties' and ruled that the real
test in the case of a penalty is whether its allowance as a deduction would frustrate the
sharply defined policy of the statute, the question being decided in every case ad hoc,"
112. See NLRB v. Bishop, 288 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1955).
113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
COMMENTS
are but examples of creativity on the part of the Board. These efforts are en-
countering a somewhat reluctant judiciary. The courts have generally failed to
view all the interests in a given situation. In addition they have applied un-
helpful standards in passing on the orders created by the Board. Nevertheless,
the courts remain the key to more effective remedies if such remedies are to come
from the Board within its present powers and the cooperation of the courts is
therefore essential. An alternative to that means of attaining the goal of more
effective remedies is a broadening of the Board's power through legislative
action. The result of such legislative action is not altogether predictable since
its effectiveness would depend on how the Board would use the new power and
ultimately how the courts would restrict that use. It would seem that Congress
could best contribute to the desired end of effective remedies by encouraging
the Board to continue its efforts under its present mandate. That is, the Board
should be encouraged to continue to fashion remedies which in fact "effectuate
the policies of the Act."
MICHAEL H. STEPHENS
THE KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN: A CATALYST IN THE SEARCH
FOR A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its advent on the American scene, the automobile has had a profound
impact in the areas of socio-economics and law. In more recent times, the
ubiquitous automobile invades most aspects of normal daily living. Our dynamic
society has grown to consider such means of transportation an almost absolute
necessity. In our cities, houses are being demolished every day so that new roads
can be built to accommodate the increasing automotive traffic burden. And as
more vehicles appear on our highways, the somber prospect is that more accidents
will occur. When this happens, inevitably one's thoughts turn to liability and
insurance.
The general rule of common law liability in most American jurisdictions
compensates victims of automobile accidents based on the concept of fault, i.e.,
any loss incurred by the victim is tecoverable against the party at fault. The
rule of contributory fault imposes the added requirement that an injured party
must be free from culpability in order to recover against a wrongdoer. The
validity of the fault and contributory fault principles have withstood formidable
challenges in the past, but the ground swell of dissatisfaction has never been
more pronounced than in the last three years. One catalyst of this increased
dialogue between the proponents and the opponents of the fault system has
been the proposal formulated by Professor Robert E. Keeton and Professor
